Opinion. «Mythology of Belarus» on the expectations of the parties from the migration crisis

Illustration: "Mythology of Belarus" Telegram channel
3 mins

На русском языке: Мнение. «Мифология Беларуси» об ожиданиях сторон от миграционного кризиса
На беларускай мове: Меркаванне. «Міфалогія Беларусі» пра чаканні бакоў ад міграцыйнага крызісу

The Telegram channel «Mythology of Belarus» published a post about what expectations the Belarusian authorities have from the migration crisis at the Belarusian-Polish border, and which ones from other interested parties. Here is the opinion unchanged.

Recently, the Kremlin publicly outlined its expectation regarding the migration crisis at the border between Belarus and the EU.

«Yesterday, at some political science discussions, they said: why when refugees came from Turkey, the EU allocated funding so that they remained on the territory of the Republic of Turkey. Why can’t we help Belarusians in the same way?» –asked Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister.

It was this game of table tennis and the strategic interest of the Kremlin that we wrote about in summer at the initial stage of the migration crisis: «The EU, through the introduction of sectoral sanctions, is trying to increase the Kremlin’s spending on the maintenance of Belarus. And the Kremlin, through the instrument of illegal migration, may try to shift the burden of costs to the EU. Ping-pong».

In fact, no one – neither the West, nor Russia, especially nor China – wants to seriously invest in the unprofitable enterprise the BSSR-2. However, its permanent leader demands from neighbors funds for the maintenance of its key personnel and all other employees of the enterprise — pay for your peace and tranquility.

There is a direct correlation between the level of escalation of the migration situation and the number of threats to block the transit of gas and oil on the one hand, and the degree of shortage of financial resources on the other.

The more acutely Lukashenka requires external financial injections and the closer the effect of Western economic sanctions, the higher the stakes in the foreign policy confrontation soar.

To hedge against financial turmoil amid the promised February 2022 referendum, Lukashenka needs either an early lifting of sectoral sanctions or a couple of billion dollars to amortize them, ideally before the new year.

The EU is not yet amenable to pressure and doesn’t intend to retreat – Merkel’s call was more of a humanitarian action in the interests of unfortunate trapped migrants than an invitation to dialogue and a large package agreement. There’s no talk from the EU about the lifting of sanctions and payment for the resolution of the migration issue, as it was previously with Turkey, yet.

In total, the most likely source of borrowing remains the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (read: the Kremlin).

However, the Kremlin, taking this opportunity, presses and, apparently, linked serious financial support with the unequivocal recognition of the Crimea as Russian. A couple of billion will be found, the Kremlin hints, but the casket with them is in the Crimea — welcome!

Support us even without this, given the contribution to the «allied» confrontation with the West, and that a real regional conflict between Russia (CSTO) – NATO wouldn’t flare up, Lukashenka retaliates.

Based on these positions of the parties, the migration situation is still far from being resolved.

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